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The spurious aka counterfeit components represent still a serious danger for functionality, reliability and lifetime of any 
electronic device these components are part of its manufactured assembly. There exist a lot of methods aimed at 
revealing counterfeit components before they are used in electronic module production. Those methods differ in 
complexity and also in counterfeit component filtering yield. In short, any efficient method based on specification 
parameters manifestation, functionality and appearance comparison is applicable. This presentation illustrates the 
diagnostic abilities of some representative methods for counterfeit components preventive filtering from a production 
process. As a result of our research activities, the capability of popularly known Analogue Signature Analysis method is 
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The electronic component authenticity verification represents a very important act especially for any company 
producing application specific assemblies nowadays. The problem of disingenuous electronic components represents an 
increasing worldwide problem in course of about last twelve years. These components are presented as original 
products by OCMs (Original Component Manufacturers) according to their labeling, logos, delivery accompanying 
documentation etc. [1]  There are some very frequent notions distinguishing such kind of electronic components from 
genuine ones, as for instance counterfeit components, fake components, bogus. The sources for component 
counterfeiting are quite varied ones. It could be a discarded batch originating from the component original 
manufacturer, or it could be a refurbished component from a trash of electronic modules which were not recycled 
properly that means according to the Basel Convention [7] and following national legal acts. The reason which attracts 
those who are counterfeiting electronic component is a same one as at other illegal or criminal activities, gain 
interesting amount of money and invest less than in legal activities. The components counterfeited types are also varied 
ones and demand dependent. The surveys and reports [1] are showing that we can encounter counterfeited discrete 
components, integrated circuits up to very sophisticated ones, passive components, relays etc. Briefly stating, the range 
of electronic components counterfeited types is very wide, and only its proportion in supply varies according to the 
market demand and in particular cases.  The counterfeited component level of technology can also differ from obsolete 
components up to modern advanced types which are of latest design, but there is a shortage of them because of limited 
production capacity in relation to the interest on the market at that very moment. The occurrence of components having 
been remarked from a lower cheaper class to a higher one being fraudulently misrepresented as military grade 
components for sensitive applications is also very frequent [1].  
The obsolete components business represents a chapter for itself in activities related to counterfeited electronic 
components.  The long life time systems with the time period of operation up to twenty or thirty years are supposed to 
be repaired and maintained with original spare parts which are at the time of repair obsolete and no more in production. 
The fighter F-15 can serve as an example because it was put into service in 1975 and was scheduled to be in service 
well beyond 2010 eventually. That means that it had been used far after its original end-of-life projections. Moreover, 
the electronic component life cycle gets shorter because of new designs and new production technologies, and it could 
be well as short as two years only  [3] [1]. It is possible to procure obsolete components from an original manufacturer 
in some cases, nevertheless, it always depends on ordered quantity, and it is fully understandable that the price will be 
much higher than at the time of active production and delivery time will be much longer. Such situation motivates and 
encourages the obsolete components counterfeited alternatives offer because that is an ideal opportunity to utilize that 
refurbished electronic trash supply. The general effort for cost reduction acts as a joint influence promoting the 
counterfeit components penetration the electronic systems production [1]. 
The big customers with substantial needs for electronic components can mitigate the counterfeit components 
problem easier than smaller ones because they can arrange the component supply directly from the original 
manufacturers. Nevertheless, there is also possible that the original component manufacturer can detect counterfeit 
components warehouses because of global logistics [1]. Smaller customers may quite frequently experience situation 
when they need to look for required components supply from alternative sources. Especially the odd and unproven 
supplier represents an extremely high risk in spite of its attractive prices and very short delivery times. It is just for that 
attractiveness recommended to be very careful and distrustful. 
 
2. How to prevent counterfeit components invasion 
 
There have elapsed about twelve years since the counterfeit components were detected in sensitive military, 
space research and life influencing medical systems. These detections were an alarming reality calling for immediate 
countermeasures development and acceptance [4]. The counterfeit components prevention encompasses quite a wide 
range of activities nowadays. These activities can be categorized according to their content and way of contribution to 
the common effort to stop the counterfeited electronic components penetration in crucial assemblies and systems. 
Sharing experience is a very important activity because it can help the others to be oriented, warned and inspired how to 
notice or reveal suspicious features at the particular consignment. There is a lot of websites operated by qualified and 
experienced professionals and expert organizations [5]. Presenting pictures illustrating a particular experience with 
stressed signs of counterfeiting is a sensitive concern not to influence negatively the reputation of component 
manufactures being blameless and not involved, only their names and logos were misused for labeling a fake 
component, or their SoC were misused for the integrated circuit assembly. Also subjects reporting their own experience 
with disingenuous components should be kept in anonymity when they do not wish to go public. There are also 
websites related to the government or to other authorities involved in the counterfeit components problem solution. 
These websites are offering comprehensive information and instructions for preventive measures [6]. 
The instructions what to do and the company counterfeit component prevention policy is one important aspect 
of reasonable preventive behavior. The other aspect covers methods for revealing definite attributes or proves of 
counterfeiting. Those detection methods range from very simple and relatively cheap ones, like a visual inspection of 
component and its accompanying documentation and packaging appearance, up to very sophisticated and expensive 
methods, like X-ray inspection, scanning acoustic microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, parametric testing etc. 
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[2]. In fact, all methods comprising equipment and procedures being able to detect any difference between an original 
genuine component and its alternative to be verified are theoretically applicable. Their implementation depends on 
particular subject situation and on expected components quantity to be tested. Simple and cheaper methods are 
affordable even for small companies. However, the reliable verdict in many tricky cases calls for in-depth tests with 
corresponding equipment and trained experienced personnel. Such analytical laboratories are frequently independent 
subjects and certified as experts for counterfeit component assessment as those randomly selected references are 
illustrating [8] [9] [10] [11]. Some advanced testing laboratories are offering also inventory for electronic components, 
incoming tests for counterfeit components, repackaging and delivery to customers. We can mention Equality Process, 
Inc. and North Shore Components, Inc. as illustrative example among many others [12] [13]. 
The independent laboratories and laboratories controlled by the government are offering paid services in 
relation to production technology problems as well as to component counterfeiting attributes tracing for companies 
interested in an external assessment. However, the big suppliers of electronic components including obsolete 
components have introduced gradually their own test procedures and they have qualified reliable electronic component 
sources to guarantee customers a counterfeit-free delivery by themselves. We can mention again only two examples on 
behalf the others [14] [15]. 
There are not only technical means engaged in defense against counterfeit components invading electronic 
assemblies and systems. Organizational means are also playing an important role, especially in relation to portfolio of 
suppliers and their credibility. Even standardization process in the field of counterfeit components penetration 
preventive measures has been developing since early after the first counterfeit components incidence, and there exist a 
lot of standards, regulations and written rules guiding and helping subjects to behave according to the risk and threat 
involved [22] [23].  
 
3. Our laboratory for electronic component analysis 
 
As also our experience from meetings, seminars and from cooperation with local companies in the field of 
counterfeits components testing has revealed, that local companies have limited budgets and product profit reserves to 
cover costs for establishing an incoming electronic component inspection at a necessary level. They are willing to detect 
some discrepancies in accompanying documentation, during visual inspection in rare cases, but they care mostly for a 
specialized external laboratory to perform qualified tests for them. We have decided to react proactively on that 
motivating impulse, and we started to build up a diagnostic laboratory for that purpose in frames of our educational 
themes focused on security technologies about three years ago. We had already a helpful initiation into counterfeited 
electronic components worldwide problem thanks to a very useful device based on analogue signature analysis 
principles [18] [21]. That device was designed directly for counterfeit integrated detection, and our experiments with it 
has aroused our curiosity and need to learn more about that problem. The counterfeit IC detector is a very useful part of 
our laboratory equipment now. It has 256 channels to be assigned arbitrarily to the tested component pins. If the 
component has more than 256 pins, the test can be accomplished in more than one step until all pins are tested. Of 
course, the crucial part of the whole test arrangement is the test contact adapter corresponding with the component 
package. Fig. 1, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 illustrate the workplace with counterfeit IC detector, its contact interface and some 




Fig. 1. Component I-V characteristics evaluation arrangement 
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Fig. 3. The counterfeit IC detector contact interface 
 
The counterfeit IC detector has a wider application possibility than its original orientation. We are also using it 
for the evaluation of the laser beam influence on the SoC (System on Chip) functionality in course of laser 
decapsulation procedure development. The initial component I-V characteristics set serves as a reference model for 
comparison how deep we can perform the package material ablation until the I-V characteristic deformation starts. The 
fiber laser decapsulation equipment is the other tool component in our laboratory [19]. We have preferred laser 
decapsulation equipment to a wet etch automated equipment because of laser higher flexibility and wider range of 
application. Unlike laser, etch equipment is able to provide a very clean SoC revelation and preserve the component full 
functionality what is important for subsequent functional and failure analysis. Nevertheless, the laser equipment 
ablation recipe flexibility was decisive for us so that we have decided to combine the functionality safe partial laser 
ablation with a final wet etch process. The goals for the final etch process were simplicity, material consumption, 
temperature and waste reduction. Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 are illustrating the workplace with fiber laser and ablation 
process results. Fig. 5 illustrates the partially ablated package material before the final etching. Fig. 6 illustrates the 
possibility to perform ablation exclusively by laser when the functionality is not important, and only the SoC label is to 
be identified. It is quite apparent that the laser beam energy has destroyed the protection layer of nitride oxide and also 
partially the SoC upper layers. Nevertheless, it was well possible to conclude that the package label differed from the 
SoC one. That pure laser ablation result can be still improved by using a better tuned recipe. 
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Fig. 5. The partially laser ablated component package material before final etch 
 
The sort of materials standardly used for chip protection, chip bonding interconnection with outer contact 
system is a varied one [16]. That is why every component type group has to be approached carefully and experimentally 
because especially suspicious components do not have any trustful reference to be queried. The failure analysis 




Fig. 6. System on chip ablated only by a laser beam 
. 
A combined process of preparatory laser ablation in the first stage and wet etching in second stage seems for us 
to be a solution corresponding with our particular situation. The result of after final standard etch ablation process with 
nitric and sulfuric acid mixture is documented with Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7. The SoC after final etch process 
 
4. The analytical methods application results 
 
Our research and feedback experiment effort aims at laser ablation process refinement to make better use of all 
adjustable process parameters. The simple ablation process modification at fiber laser equipment leads to a quick 
verification possibility of any idea how the particular component should be ablated. The following Fig. 8, Fig. 9 and 
Fig. 10 illustrate some variants of experimental ablation process. The circular shape first stage ablation opening is very 
apt for the successive chemical etch treatment because it holds the etch mixture on required area without any supporting 
gasket, and there is only a little tendency to damage area outside the circular barrier providing the etch agent is dosed 
accurately and carefully. The etch process is done manually to keep simplicity in our case. That was also a reason for 








Fig. 9. Package material laser ablated in chip and vicinity area 
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Fig. 10. Camera view of a laser beam activity area 
 
We have succeeded to decrease the etch process temperature down to 50°C and less preserving a reasonable 
process speed with very good results. We have reached that positive achievement with some additives to standard 
mixtures of nitric and sulfuric acids. Fig. 11 shows the SoC after our modified etch treatment. The SoC label readability 
is perfect and the functionality is predominantly influenced by the laser ablation process. 
As was reported in reference [20], the component package filling material can influence not only the laser ablation 
process but even the laser marking process, especially when the filling material are glass globules. They can act not 
only as lenses but also as an optical channel for the laser beam allowing it to penetrate deeper than expected during 
estimating the layer to be ablated with laser. We have concluded that some partial damages of nitride oxide protection 
layer were caused by that effect. Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 illustrate our own experience with filling material having been 









Fig. 12. Globules of glass in formed socket Fig. 13. More detailed picture of glass globules 
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The important part of preventive testing procedures is to procure and keep verified original components with 
relevant documentation to all sensitive electronic parts to be assembled in a particular production process because of 
comparison possibility during the alternative components delivery testing. That should be a rule not only for a test 
laboratory but for any company which is assembling systems from electronic components to prevent tricky situations in 
the future. Those model components should be archived immediately during the product development and always when 
the alternative components are tested for the circuitry. 
 
5. Methods extension and development plans 
 
Our current test laboratory activities feel the lack of X-ray equipment designed especially for counterfeit 
components detection. Such device is very useful not only for a non-destructive inspection of components and the 
comparison of internal chip, lead-frame and bonding wires structural appearance inspection. X-ray device can help laser 
device to aim more accurately at the chip position inside the package before ablation starts. There is even possible for 
laser to orient the location of ablation process according to the X-ray imported picture of the particular component. The 
project for X-ray equipment procurement is running currently and we expect it to be installed by the end of this year. 
We also plan to extend the range of component package adapters for counterfeit IC detector to be able to react 
more flexibly to particular component types test requirements. Last but not least task is the contact resistance treatment 
before I-V characteristic recording and analysing because the storing and handling history of suspicious component is 
unknown. The leads appearance, oxides and damages presence optical inspection is always necessary before any 
electrical measurement and the relevant preparatory treatment for decreasing the contact resistance is required. 
The laser ablation process and final etch process development and refinement belongs logically to our close 
future plans. The supporting fixtures design and realization as well as light sources range extension for optical 




Our research project was aimed at establishing a laboratory equipped with affordable equipment for electronic 
component authenticity analysis at the very beginning. We have started that equipping process in a modest way because 
the university budget is limited and it has to cover many other projects. The government and European Community 
funding support allowed us to obtain also more expensive equipment like a fiber laser and special X-ray equipment 
which should be only shipped. Nevertheless, the comprehensive electronic component authenticity analysis represents 
the application of a wide range of special equipment like for instance acoustic microscopy, IR spectroscopy and X-ray 
spectroscopy. That poses a certain analytical limit for our laboratory currently. We take our project task as a continuous 
development of methods, learning by experiment and trying to involve more methods and equipment which are at 
disposal for other projects or which will be possible to procure in the future. Among the others, we can mention Raman 
spectroscopy [25] and atomic force microscopy (AFM) [24]. Our faculty possesses that equipment in other projects 
laboratories. Those laboratories are engaged in the field of security technologies what is tightly interlinked also with 
electronic component authenticity assessment. Raman spectroscopy is a very promising method for electronic 
component assembly materials composition analysis and also for component production quality grade assessment [26]. 
Our project is not a one-time task to be fulfilled and terminated. It represents a dynamic set of activities being 
adapted according to experience, research results and conditions for further development and extension. In spite of that, 
we are already cooperating with local companies in the field of electronic component authenticity assessment with very 
good and applicable results. We are still not in position of a certified expert laboratory that is why we are doing all 
analysis on a voluntary basis so far. The experience gained during all voluntary analyses means a precious knowledge 
and feedback for our further development. It also gives us an important inspiration for our analytical methods 
modification and completion. 
We are working on a promising assumption that the role of suspicious components inspection methods is still 
of extreme high topicality and it always has sense to look for new principles and methods highlighting the component 
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